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ABSTRACT

Emotions constitute an integral part of the diverse approaches
that we bring to bear upon our most pressing law and policy issues.
This article explores the role of emotions in intellectual property,
information, and technology law (IP). Like other areas of law, IP
commits to, prioritizes, and even honors, reason, logic, and facts—
which can result in the sidelining of the affective components of law.
Yet our affective responses to legal and other phenomena influence
both cognition and reason. Part I of the article provides a general
overview of the field of law and emotions, pointing out how this
approach to understanding law already exists, albeit still mostly
* Donald & Lynda Horowitz Professor for the Pursuit of Justice, and former Associate Dean for
Research at Seattle University School of Law. Many thanks to the hosts of the University of Akron
School of Law Fall 2020 Intellectual Property Scholars Forum for the invitation. This article
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College of Law, in 2018; it was presented also at the 2019 Suffolk University Intellectual Property
and Innovation Conference. It benefited from generous comments made by participants at all these
events, as well as subsequent readings by Deidré A. Keller, Lateef Mtima, and Rich Schur. Thanks to
Jenny Wu (Seattle University School of Law Class of 2021) for her excellent research support.
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incipiently, within IP. For example, our affective responses help to
reinforce one of our main assumptions about IP: that legal
incentives, such as copyrights and patents, motivate authors and
inventors to create their respective works and inventions. In Part II,
the article illustrates the operation of two specific emotions—
nostalgia and hope—to demonstrate how an intentional analysis of
emotions can impact IP law and policy. These two examples
demonstrate that understanding how emotions undergird affect,
attachment, attention, attraction, and repulsion for all areas of IP
knowledge production is an essential first step to addressing our
currently pervasive knowledge asymmetries, biases, and omissions.
Put negatively, if we continue to ignore or minimize emotions in IP,
we also will continue to risk an incomplete conceptual
configuration of IP, at the cost of thwarting the primary policy goals
of this increasingly crucial area of law.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the role of emotions in intellectual property,
information, and technology law (IP). Like other areas of law, IP commits
to, prioritizes, and even honors, reason, logic, and facts—which can result
in the sidelining of the affective components of law. 1 The field of law and
emotions 2 can help to illuminate IP, yielding new approaches and insights.
Emotions constitute an integral part of the diverse approaches that
we bring to bear upon our most pressing law and policy issues. Our
affective responses to legal and other phenomena are inseparable from our
other ways of comprehending them. A leading voice in the field of law
and emotions, Terry Maroney, has pronounced that “[o]ver the course of
the last two decades the traditional narrative casting law as a bastion of
pure reason has begun to crumble. As it crumbles we are freed to explore
the deep interconnectedness of emotion and cognition in the theory and
practice of law.” 3 And as Robin West has observed:
1. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1997, 2021 (2010) (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109 n. 22 (1974) (quoting
from Christopher Columbus Langdell) (“It was indispensable to establish at least two things; first that
law is a science; . . . “)).
2. See e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes, ed., 1999).
3. Terry A. Maroney, A Field Evolves: Introduction to the Special Section on Law and
Emotion, 8 EMOTION REV. 3, 4 (2015) [hereinafter Maroney, Field Evolves] (“People have emotions
about law itself, ranging from revulsion to reverence. Abrams and Keren set forth a helpful frame
within which to understand this constellation of interactions. Law and emotion scholarship seeks to
illuminate the affective features of legal problems; investigate these features through interdisciplinary
analysis; and integrate resulting understandings into practical, normative proposals.” (internal citation
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At least sometimes and to some degree, and sometimes for better while
often for worse . . . all sorts of legal actors—legislators, judges, jurors,
litigants, private contractors, city council members, drafters of
constitutions, the authors of universal declarations of rights, and of
course lawyers and legal scholars as well—are moved toward our
legalistic decisions or our artful legal arguments by the force of our
passions, rather than by the moral force of either shared or neutral
principles, deductions from the natural law, inferences from past
precedent, or a toting of societal costs and benefits. 4

This is not to say that emotions can be dichotomized wholly from
cognition or reason, as will be explored further below. Rather, it is to
underscore that the IP community may have systematically overlooked a
powerful means for understanding our policy choices, because the
affective turn in law may not be as readily apparent in IP as it has been in
other areas. 5
Influenced by these insights and others described below, this article
proceeds in two parts. Part I provides a general overview of the field of
law and emotions, pointing out how this approach to understanding law
already exists, albeit still mostly incipiently, within IP. For example, our
affective responses help to reinforce one of our main assumptions about
IP: that legal incentives, such as copyrights and patents, motivate authors
and inventors to create their respective works and inventions. 6 In part II,
the article illustrates the operation of two specific emotions—nostalgia
and hope—to demonstrate how an intentional analysis of emotions can
impact IP law and policy. These two examples demonstrate that
understanding how emotions undergird affect, attachment, attraction,
repulsion, and attention for all areas of IP knowledge production is an
essential first step to addressing our currently pervasive knowledge
asymmetries, biases, and omissions.
A caveat: within the limited scope of this article, it is not possible to
summarize and review the entire corpus of law and emotions scholarship.
But it is possible to point out some of the cogent reasons why this field
can expand our understanding of IP. At the very least, the relationship of
emotions to IP is worth exploring for ways in which it can challenge our
collective bias toward a primarily reason-based account of the law.
omitted). See also Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field,
30 L. HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006).
4. Robin West, Law’s Emotions, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 339, 340 (2016).
5. See Anjali Vats & Deidré A. Keller, Critical Race IP, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 735,
779–87 (2018), (describing the “affective turn” in law, particularly as applied to critical race theory).
6. See Lateef Mtima, IP Social Justice Theory: Access, Inclusion, and Empowerment, 55
GONZ. L. REV. 401 (2019) (summarizing and criticizing this overarching normative assumption).
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Moreover, greater appreciation and integration of emotion, along with
cognition and reason, may be critical to improving the quality of our
knowledge, developing effective responses to our current legal and policy
conundrums, and re-orienting our individual and collective imaginations
of IP’s potential in response to currently unimagined technologies.
II. IP AND EMOTIONS: WHAT ARE THE CONNECTIONS?
As we already know, the world outside of the law is not bound to the
reason-driven parameters that guide lawyers. Indeed, emotion-driven
decisions based on power, rather than considered policy, take place ever
more explicitly within our constitutional democracy. 7 This section begins
exploring where emotions are located within IP despite our not paying
close attention.
A.

Three-Legged Stool? Emotion, Cognition, and Reason

Regardless of any political differences, lawyers and others trained in
law likely agree upon an ideal of law that prioritizes reason over emotion.8
Influenced by the scientific tradition, this ideal often includes not only an
emphasis on logical reasoning but also a framework of evidence-based
legal decision-making within over-arching constitutional values such as
due process as well as market values such as efficiency. Whether law is
pronounced by courts or legislatures, or whether a legal position is
espoused by a litigator or a government regulator, a consensus exists in
the legal community that law and policymaking should be based
primarily, if not wholly, on these reason-based attributes. 9
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos & Emily Cochrane, After Pro-Trump Mob Storms Capitol,
Congress Confirms Biden’s Win, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/06/us/politics/congress-gop-subvert-election.html [https://perma.cc/C6W2-G23D].
8. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2003–04. They write:
The detachment of legal rationality reflected the historic view of law as a quasi-science: a
process of deducing, from a framework of legal principles, the rule to be applied to a
particular case. A detached, rationalist stance also served to insulate judges from pressure
by the political branches or from undue sympathy with one or more of the parties. Emotion
floods careful, stagewise reasoning in a tidal wave of affect; its association with particulars
sweeps decisionmakers from their impersonal, Archimedean pedestal.
Id.
9. But see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications, Inc.
1991) (1881) Holmes wrote:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.
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Whether in legal practice, policy, doctrine, or scholarship, emotions
typically occupy a subordinate space, if they are acknowledged at all. Yet
each person’s encounters with law are prefigured by earlier and present
emotional experiences. Our individual views about IP, for example, are
based not only on our predispositions as well as family and cultural
histories but also, profoundly, on our emotions. These early views are
shaped by subsequent influencers such as advisors, colleagues, idols,
mentors, and on the flip side, the deluded, misguided, and misinformed
people we disagree with, and the rogues and scoundrels who represent the
things we don’t admire in the least. These various culturally and socially
contingent responses provide the substrate for our basic understandings of
IP. 10
Emotions shape our responses to, and understanding of, law. Law in
turn shapes, or even produces, emotions. 11 Not to be conflated entirely
with cognitive responses, emotions are affective responses. Some
researchers view cognition and emotion as largely separable, whereas
others do not. 12 For example, Ellsworth and Dougherty endorse appraisal
theory, which views emotion as one of the key drivers of cognition. 13
While affective responses can influence cognition, and vice versa,
the degree of separability is not at all clear. 14 However, Abrams and Keren
Id. at 1.
10. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Cultural Cognition of Patents, 4 IP THEORY 28, 31 (2013)
(describing a cultural cognition framework where “we form beliefs that cohere with the values of
groups we identify with.”).
11. Maroney, Field Evolves, supra note 3, at 4 (“All approaches take as their bedrock the same
notion: emotion shapes law, and law needs to get emotion right in order to function well. The dynamic
also runs in the other direction: law shapes emotion.”); see generally West, supra note 4.
12. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Adrienne Dougherty, Appraisals and Reappraisals in the
Courtroom, 8 EMOTION REV. 20, 20–21 (2016) (outlining four main theories of emotions, including
basic emotions theory, valence/arousal emotions theory, constructivist theory, and appraisal theory).
13. Id. at 21. (“According to appraisal theorists, emotion and cognition are mostly inseparable.
Few emotional experiences occur without cognition, and few thoughts are completely free of emotion.
Emotions are combinations of appraisals. A change in an appraisal is a change in emotion, and a
change in emotion is a change in appraisal.”) (citation omitted).
14. Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1227, 1260–62 (2008). Bradford writes:
Emotions are part of the nervous system, arising from evolutionarily old parts of the
mammalian brain that propel behavior in historically advantageous ways. Emotions
generally identify goals and desires, leading individuals to pursue those desires in
conscious and subconscious ways. . . . Scientists have posited the existence of “somatic
markers” that lead us to classify stimuli as “good” or “bad” as we experience them. We
retrieve these feelings again upon encountering or remembering a known object or
situation. Without such somatic tones we might be paralyzed by inaction. The pleasant or
unpleasant sensation attached to an image leads the body to react instinctively, much in
the same way it reacts unconsciously to hunger, pain, fatigue, or other internal stimuli.
Such reactions happen automatically and cause an instant reaction without conscious
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claim that the affective components of law are undervalued resources in
their own right, relative to cognitive science as well as to law and
neuroscience, and that this under-emphasis is due to “certain rationalist
and objectivist assumptions that traditional legal thought
embraces . . . .” 15 According to them, a separate consideration of emotion
per se is important. 16
In IP, as elsewhere in law, the behavioral economics revolution has
resulted in the mainstream acknowledgment of cognition as a legitimate
subject of inquiry. 17 Cognitive science has gained a strong foothold in IP,
especially through the behavioral economics strand of law and economics.
Yet, cognition, emotion, and reason are mutually constitutive. 18 As Laura
Bradford, one of the few IP scholars to examine intentionally the role of
emotion in IP doctrine, states:
Because individuals are not always aware of the degree of attraction or
aversion (the “emotional valence”) they may harbor toward a specific
object or event, emotion can act as an unconscious shortcut or heuristic.
Individuals are drawn to one option, ignoring or dismissing the rest, for
reasons they cannot consciously describe. 19

This is a very different insight than those gleaned from cognitive science
or neuroscience, 20 as related as those fields are. 21
thought. Scientists theorize that such mechanisms enabled primitive humans to run when
they encountered dangerous situations without first having to pause to plan how to react.
In the same way, modern humans rely on somatic tones in weighing abstract outcomes.
We are instinctively drawn in or repulsed by the affective markers our experiences have
assigned to each outcome. Thus, emotion is what gives us the impetus to make decisions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2018.
16. See id. at 2032–33.
17. See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141 (2008). Abrams and Keren observe:
[M]uch of behavioral law and economics analysis does not analyze responses that we
would describe as emotions, but focuses rather on nonaffective cognitive assumptions that
depart from rationality. In that sense the domain of behavioral law and economics overlaps
with, but is not coterminous with, that of law and emotions.
Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2020.
18. Bradford, supra note 14, at 1260 (“[a] growing body of literature suggests that emotions
do not operate in opposition to reason, but are in fact critical to any form of decision-making.”).
19. Id. at 1262.
20. See Amanda S. Bruce, Jared M. Bruce, William R. Black, Rebecca J. Lepping, Janice M.
Henry, Joseph Bradley C. Cherry, Laura E. Martin, Vlad B. Papa, Ann M. Davis, William M. Brooks
& Cary R. Savage, Branding and a Child’s Brain: An fMRI Study of Neural Responses to Logos, 9
SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 118 (2014) (neuroimaging study motivated by
understanding the intense marketing toward youth driven by companies’ ambitions for brand
recognition, preference, and loyalty).
21. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2032–33. Abrams and Keren opine:
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When emotions are acknowledged in IP, they are almost always
subsumed within a cognitive science framework, cast as an improved
variation of pure utilitarianism. 22 This echoes efforts by non-IP scholars
to treat emotional responses as measurable deviations from the choices
made by a rational actor. 23 For example, some IP scholars have recent
evaluated the relation of happiness and well-being to IP law and policy. 24
In this work, the emotion of happiness is treated as a supplement to, or
substitute for, consumer preferences measured within a utilitarian
scaffolding. Some IP scholars have even considered but rejected
incorporating the variable of emotion in their economic analyses of
preferences, apparently believing that emotion is a trivial factor. 25
Unsurprisingly, trademark law includes more analysis of emotion
than do the other areas of IP, due to the clear linkages between trademarks
and marketing. 26 Of course, marketing strategies rely heavily on consumer

Undoubtedly, we need the work of behavioral economics to analyze flawed heuristics, and
create “choice architecture” that facilitates rational decisionmaking.
Similarly, we need neuroscience to help us understand the brain mechanisms that shape
the human cognition and its limitations, and to glimpse the ways in which these patterns
might be germane to legal decisionmaking. But, despite the rationalist and objectivist
premises that continue to ground legal instincts, we also need a broader and more diverse
set of resources from disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, cultural
studies, philosophy, and literature. . . [e]motions [are] not simply . . . temporary deviations
from rationality (behavioral studies) or . . . forms of neural function (brain studies), but
also, at times, . . . distinct and significant supplemental means of apprehending the world.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 14, at 1258.
23. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001).
24. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the
Promotion of Welfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW (VOL. I: THEORY) 98 (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., 2019)) (“The personal bond between
creators and their works is recognized as particularly strong in comparison to the general level of
attachment that owners may develop towards their goods.”); accord Estelle Derclaye, Chapter 7.
What can intellectual property law learn from happiness research?, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177, 191 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013) (“In sum, economic growth
should no longer be a major goal. Governments should perform a different type of cost–benefit
analysis (namely choose those policies that will increase happiness the most for any given cost). Some
propose to even move from a cost–benefit analysis to a well-being analysis.”).
25. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2010) (noting that “[w]hile there might be good reasons to
credit creators’ valuations if they are the result of regret aversion or enhanced feelings of emotional
attachment, we can see no valid reason for respecting pricing decisions that are driven almost
exclusively by irrational biases.”); but see Ofer Tur-Sinai, The Endowment Effect in IP Transactions:
The Case Against Debiasing, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117 (2011) (critiquing the
decision by Buccafusco & Sprigman to ignore impact of emotion in their experimental research).
26. See, e.g., Bernd Schmitt, The Consumer Psychology of Brands, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
7 (2012).
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psychology, including its affective components. 27 And as Leah Chan
Grinvold has pointed out, allegations of trademark infringement involve
the possibility of shaming in response to trademark enforcement. 28 But all
areas of IP, and all heuristics that IP legal actors employ, involve emotion,
to a greater or lesser extent.
Furthermore, emotion-driven decisions regarding IP are not merely
private decisions that have no consequence outside of one’s own
individual preference set, but rather form collective emotional preferences
that lead to what could be called a culture of IP. 29 Susan Bandes, another
pioneer in the area of law and emotions, along with her co-author Jeremy
Blumenthal, point out:
Emotions are social processes that arise, in part, through interactions or
anticipated interactions with others. They both influence and are
influenced by social, cultural, and institutional context. . . . Emotions
such as shame, fear, trust, and the desire for approval are intimately
involved in the development, communication, and enforcement of the
norms animating law. 30

That is, law and emotions scholars emphasize the inherently
communal quality of emotions.
If these insights have any traction, then how do emotions inform the
particular assumptions, biases, and motivations of legal actors within the
IP community? People specialize in IP for many reasons. IP revolves
around powerful cultural memes of the author, creator, inventor, as well
27. See Bradford, supra note 14, at 1233–35; Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds:
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008). Bradford observes:
[T]rademark dilution law is so difficult to understand because it aims at emotion and only
indirectly at information. The emotion referred to here is of the most basic kind: “affect”
or the automatic negative or positive response that a mark generates when viewed by a
consumer. . . . The emotion literature suggests, in contradiction to the claims of dilution
regulation proponents, that much of the “selling power” of famous marks is due primarily
to their familiarity and not any specific benefit, tangible or intangible, of the product.
Bradford, supra note 14, at 1233–35 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore:
Experiments have confirmed that repeated exposure to a stimulus alone increases positive
feelings toward the stimulus. This is known as the “mere exposure” effect. The dominant
explanation for the “mere exposure” effect is that the positive reaction to familiar stimuli
is a function of ease of recall rather than a conscious appraisal of prior experience with the
stimulus [in low involvement conditions].
Id. at 1266–67.
28. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 687 (2011).
29. As C.P. Snow put it, speaking of physical scientists: “Without thinking about it, they
respond alike. That is what culture means.” C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION 11 (1959).
30. Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 161, 172 (2012) (citation omitted).
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as entrepreneurship, innovation, and progress. These robust concepts have
both overt and implicit positive emotional associations to most people,
including those whose work revolves around IP. Most IP legal actors
believe that they are doing good (or at least doing no harm), and IP’s
emotional penumbra is a good place to find oneself aligned with this
overall goal. These individual beliefs tend to produce and reproduce
positive affective or emotional responses.
Our individual and communal passions may not be dangerous in and
of themselves. They serve constructive purposes, such as motivating us to
action. But they also may interfere with our fuller understanding of how
IP intersects with cultural, political, and social context to further the
underlying purposes of IP: for example, to “promote Progress” 31 for the
overall social good.
Furthermore, unacknowledged and emotionally-laden idealizations
about IP assume certain conventions as starting points, which then can be
semi-impervious to challenge or reconsideration. In other words, they
tend to reinforce the status quo. As critical race scholar Anjali Vats
recently observed about IP:
[A]nxieties about race, nation, and citizenship developed in ways that
were mutually constitutive with anxieties about knowledge production,
labor, and economics. . . . Intellectual property law is bound up with
narratives of race, nation, and citizenship, as well as their attendant
“structures of feeling” . . . . 32

B.

Locating Emotions in IP: A Brief Survey

What are the results of the collective emotional investments of IP
legal actors? One example can be found in our discussions and debates
over incentive theory. The positive emotional attachments (and related
cognitive commitments) to the incentive explanation for IP may obscure
our field’s full acceptance of evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, we

31.
32.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
ANJALI VATS, THE COLOR OF CREATORSHIP: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, RACE, AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICANS 7 (2020). Vats further states:
[S]hared feelings are what bring individuals together and “bind the imagined white subject
and nation together.” Shared feelings among white men about how intellectual property
law should work and who should benefit from its legal determinations were wrapped up
with racial ideals of citizenship and national identity, in a manner that coalesced to produce
apparently race neutral legal decisions and economic policies.
Id. at 31 (quoting Sara Ahmed).
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may overlook the many ways in which emotions undergird many other
areas of IP, whether law on the books or “in action.” 33
In copyright, the conventional frame idealizes or mythologizes the
individual creative genius—what Peter Jaszi and others have termed
Romantic Authorship 34—despite ample evidence of creativity without the
need for, or even despite, the copyright incentive. This countervailing
evidence includes, for example, Glynn Lunney’s empirical quantitative
research of musical works showing that incentive theory does not
adequately describe the actual output of twentieth-century musical works
affected by the reward of copyright. 35 Paul Heald’s research suggests the
same regarding the availability of books. 36 Relatedly, Jessica Silbey’s
interviews with various scientists, engineers, musicians, artists, as well as
their lawyers, demonstrates the mismatch between the dominant incentive
theory and motivations for creativity and invention on the ground. 37
Analogously, patent law clings to its sole-inventor origin stories 38
despite evidence of increasing activities by non-practicing entities, the
prevalence of simultaneous invention, and the treatment of patents as an
asset or investment rather than an incentive. 39 Nonetheless incentive
theory—and an arguable over-investment in its continued validation and
success—continues to dominate the IP knowledge communities even as it
arguably deflects attention away from other ways of framing, knowing,
and shaping knowledge systems.
From perspectives outside of law and emotions, IP scholars have
explained these attachments to incentive theory as deliberate cover for
other ends, such as maximizing rent-seeking by powerful interest groups
like copyright industries and owners. 40 Others view these affinities as
33. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12 (1910); Bill Clune,
Law in Action and Law on the Books: A Primer, NEW LEGAL REALISM: EMPIRICAL L. & SOC’Y (June
12, 2013), http://newlegalrealism.org/2013/06/12/law-inaction-and-law-on-the-books-a-primer/
[https://perma.cc/59Y6-2T5R].
34. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991).
35. GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING
INDUSTRY (2018).
36. PAUL HEALD, COPY THIS BOOK!: WHAT DATA TELLS US ABOUT COPYRIGHT AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2020).
37. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2015).
38. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 710 (2012).
39. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 560 (2015).
40. Jaszi, supra note 34, at 500–01 (“‘[A]uthorship’ has remained what it was in eighteenthcentury England—a stalking horse for economic interests that were (as a tactical matter) better
concealed than revealed, and a convenient generative metaphor for legal structures that facilitated the
emergence of new modes of production for literary and artistic works.”).
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cognitively driven by prior cultural commitments, 41 or even by faithbased belief, akin to religious belief. 42 Drawing on the work of Thurman
Arnold, part of the Yale legal realist group and a founding member of
Arnold & Porter, Shyamkrishna Balaganesh touches upon IP and
emotions when he points to the function of conceptual vessels like
“author” or “inventor” as “emotionally important social symbols” 43 that
mediate between institutional ideals and the realities on the ground—
thereby resolving for insiders the contradictions, incongruities, and
incommensurabilities in institutional practices.
In addition to these likely explanations, one can view this attachment
to incentive theory from the perspective of emotions—including affect
and attachment. Those in IP may “know” that IP provides incentives for
creative and inventive activity because we want to feel (rather than know)
that we’re doing the right thing with our efforts. Colloquially, we may like
the “buzz” we get when we think that legal incentives make a difference,
that economic progress continues to move in the right direction, that
policy matters, and that we can make it turn out right in the end somehow
(if not live happily ever after).
While incentive theory is one of several important IP frameworks
that could benefit from considering emotions more intentionally,44 other
obvious emotional plays occur in IP. A quick (and necessarily incomplete)
spin around different areas of IP illuminates many ways in which
emotions are embedded within the field. Of course, copyright law’s
protection of expressive content provokes positive and negative feelings
on the part of both authors and consumers of those works. For example,
authors may feel angry or outraged when their works of authorship are
changed or used without authorization, 45 or when they cannot control the
rights to their own works due to industry overreach. 46 Similar affective
41. Ouellette, supra note 10.
42. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1336 (2015).
43. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Folklore and Symbolism of Authorship in American
Copyright Law, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 403, 419 (2016) (quoting THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS
OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1935)).
44. Another is the myth of IP uniformity. See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, The Myth of Uniformity
in IP Laws, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 277 (2018).
45. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., May 28, 1991, Bull
civ. I, No. 172 (Fr.); see also, Nicholas Swyrydenko, Comment, Film Artists Bushwhacked by the
Coloroids: One-Hundredth Congress to the Rescue?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 359 (1989) (describing
controversy over colorization of John Huston’s films who complained of being “bushwhacked by the
coloroids”).
46. Anastasia Tsioulcas, Look What They Made Her Do: Taylor Swift To Re-Record Her
Catalog, NPR (Aug. 22, 2019, 11:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/22/753393630/look-whatthey-made-her-do-taylor-swift-to-re-record-her-catalog [https://perma.cc/FY6Q-SDL2].
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responses may occur in response to appropriation of cultural heritage that
may not be protected by copyright, such as oral performances. 47 These
negative emotions are often subsumed within the doctrinal categories of
moral rights or attribution rights, but also undergird discussions of
infringement and fair use. 48 On the positive emotional side, copyrighted
content can elicit delight, joy, or even awe. Both Madhavi Sunder and
Julie Cohen have explored the intrinsic emotional value of playing with
copyrighted works, which then can enhance educational impacts of these
works. 49 Happy engagement with inventions and trademark designs, by
either the owners or putative infringers, can also further overall
understanding and learning, which then furthers the goals of IP. 50 Camilla
Hrdy and Daniel Brean even claim that science fiction, viewed primarily
as fanciful works within the realm of copyright, can lead to the furthering
of technological progress via patented inventions. 51
In legal practice, emotions are key to decisions made by juries and
judges. 52 Indeed, law and emotions scholarship often focuses on the
litigation space because of the palpable emotional rhetoric deployed in
jury trials. 53 In his extensive analysis of the business and economic aspects
of IP, Robert Merges documents a sea change in patent infringement
litigation since 1982, when general litigators started to replace specialized
patent lawyers in the courtroom. This change is presumably in part due to
the formers’ effective deployment of emotion to juries, compared to the
patent lawyers’ long custom of making technical arguments to the

47. Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 186 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Trevor G. Reed, Fair Use As Cultural Appropriation, 109 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456164
[https://perma.cc/K48S-LUQS].
49. See generally Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience, 117 MICH. L. REV.
197 (2018); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012) (discussing critical
importance of play in human development).
50. See 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
mentioned”), http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html [https://perma.cc/V2JR-DJDA]; see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124, amended by Act of 1802, 2 Stat.
171. But see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations Without
a Theme, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 971 (2010) (tracing ambiguity in the act’s “encouragement of
learning” goal).
51. Camilla Alexandra Hrdy & Daniel Harris Brean, Enabling Science Fiction, 27 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3748840 [https://perma.cc/5MCL-5SR4].
52. See, e.g., Ellsworth & Dougherty, supra note 12.
53. See, e.g., Maroney, Field Evolves, supra note 3, at 5–6 (examining the emotional decisionmaking of judges and jurors).
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bench. 54 Less flamboyant models of emotionally informed decisionmaking may involve patent office examiners or judges who engage in
intuitions about patent eligibility, as pointed out by Emily Michiko
Morris, 55 or judges who determine the reach of an equitable defense such
as patent misuse, as Christina Laser has documented. 56 These quieter
examples arguably involve reliance upon emotions by legal actors in
response to indeterminate legal standards such as “technology” or
“fairness.” The assessment of enhanced damages necessarily includes an
analysis of the patent defendant’s subjective wantonness in committing
infringement, which arguably also includes an evaluation of the emotional
state of the defendant, as assessed by the decision-maker. 57
Fear looms large as an emotion in all areas of litigation. No doubt,
all IP defendants experience the emotion of fear, as Mark Schultz
observed in copyright infringement litigation strategies pursued by the
recording industry. 58 Members of Congress may also respond to fearbased arguments as they consider proposed legislation. For example,
testimony at the hearings on the Coons-Tillis proposed amendments to the
eligibility provisions of the Patent Act raised the fearful specter of other
nations breaching potentially unprotected technologies such as AI,
quantum computing, and 5G, as well as biotech products such as
biologics. 59 In trade secret law and policy, it is easy to discern more than
a trace of fear-based framing of evidence and arguments. 60 And in
addition to fear, feelings of betrayal and outrage often underlie trade secret
litigation more generally. 61
In the international IP arena, geographical indications (GIs) often
trigger national pride, evidenced by the on-going debate between the old
54. ROBERT P. MERGES, AMERICAN PATENT LAW: A BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY
(forthcoming 2021).
55. Emily Michiko Morris, Intuitive Patenting, 66 S.C. L. REV. 61 (2014).
56. See Christa J. Laser, Equitable Defenses in Patent Law, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2020).
57. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427 (2018).
58. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About
Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 655 (2006) (“The music
industry has responded with lawsuits—mostly pursued by the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA)—calculated to deter file-sharers. The recording industry hopes these lawsuits will
change the behavior of file-sharers by instilling fear in potential file-sharers.”)
59. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019); The State of Patent Eligibility
in America: Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019).
60. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric:
Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419 (2016).
61. ORLY LOBEL, YOU DON’T OWN ME: HOW MATTEL V. MGA ENTERTAINMENT EXPOSED
BARBIE’S DARK SIDE (2018).
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world countries that would like to protect their cultural heritage though
GIs, and new world countries that would prefer to imitate or possibly even
improve upon IP-protected goods with specifically identifiable cultural
origins. 62 In my recent work on certification marks, I have emphasized
soft regulatory or market-based measures through what is sometimes
termed “fair trade.” 63 By doing so, perhaps I am succumbing to my strong
emotional attachment to the idea that IP can promote human flourishing
through a social justice framing of IP. 64 However, this work is also a
critique of conventional trademark legal doctrine, which centers around
an out-moded assumption of the source of origin of a good or service: a
source that used to be guilds and local manufacturers, 65 by contrast to the
brand holding companies which dominate today’s global trade
networks. 66 The IP community’s collective attachment to certain features
of trademark doctrine resembles our attachment to incentive theory in
copyright and patent law.
These passing examples show that the emotional context and content
of IP is pervasive. By recognizing, and even centering, emotions in IP, a
more accurate understanding of this field may emerge. The next part
delves into specific emotions, in order to explore their impact more
thoroughly.
III. ILLUMINATING FURTHER THE NEXUS OF IP AND EMOTIONS
A full consideration of emotions and IP would review not just such
“familiar emotions as anger, compassion, mercy, vengeance, and
hatred . . . [but also] happiness, guilt, forgiveness, romantic love,

62. See Irene Calboli, Of Markets, Culture, and Terroir: The Unique Economic and CultureRelated Benefits of Geographical Indications of Origin, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 433 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2015).
63. Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311 [hereinafter Chon, Marks
of Rectitude]. See also TIM BARTLEY, SEBASTIAN KOOS, HIRAM SAMEL, GUSTAVO SETRINI & NIK
SUMMERS, LOOKING BEHIND THE LABEL: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS
CONSUMER 29 (2015) (describing the “puzzle of rules”—by which the contradictions of neoliberal
markets are incompletely addressed through market-based rule-making projects, “from
standardization of accounting procedures to the rules for fairness and sustainability”).
64. Chon, Marks of Rectitude, supra note 63.
65. JEFFREY BELSON, CERTIFICATION AND COLLECTIVE MARKS 9-14 (2017) (describing the
regulatory origins of certification and collective marks in guilds beginning in the eleventh century);
Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839,
1850 (2007).
66. Alfonso Segura, Luxury and Fashion Corporations, FASHION RETAILER (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://fashionretail.blog/2019/04/08/luxury-and-fashion-corporations/
[https://perma.cc/ZE3Q74PL].
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gratitude, loyalty, envy, regret, and our own engagement with hope.” 67
This part focuses on two emotional responses in particular—nostalgia and
hope—to begin to determine specific ways in which emotions can be
helpful or possibly harmful in IP law and policymaking. Nostalgia is
concerned with reconstructing a past and mediating between that past and
inevitable life changes. 68 Hope is concerned with constructing an
optimistic future. Both emotions are seemingly positive, at least on the
surface. Interestingly, however, emotions researchers posit that both these
emotions can be responses to adversity, hardship, and threats, whether
perceived or real. And both can minimize the costs associated with either
past or future experiences, respectively.
A.

Nostalgia

A term coined in the late 1600s, 69 nostalgia is now commonly
understood to mean a pleasure in remembering or reliving a past
experience—smelling a food that you used to eat as a child, for example. 70
A leading researcher states that nostalgia serves multiple functions:
[N]ostalgia serves an essential psychological function [in] that it is a
highly social emotion. It connects us to other people. It does that and
[sic] so many beautiful ways. In the beginning, when we’re very young,
it’s part of what bonds us to the most important people in our life, our
parents, our siblings, our friends. As we go through life, it can broaden
67. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2046 (footnote omitted).
68. Speaking of Psychology: Does Nostalgia Have a Psychological Purpose?, AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N (November
2019), https://www.apa.org/research/action/speaking-of-psychology/nostalgia
[https://perma.cc/SQ93-GHPB] [hereinafter Speaking of Psychology] (interview with Krystine
Batcho). Batcho says:
[N]ostalgia is an emotional experience that unifies. One example of this is it helps to unite
our sense of who we are, our self, our identity over time. Because over time we change
constantly we change in incredible ways. We’re not anywhere near the same as we were
when we were three years old, for example. Nostalgia by motivating us to remember the
past in our own life helps to unite us to that authentic self and remind us of who we have
been and then compare that to who we feel we are today.
Id. See also Taylor A. FioRito & Clay Routledge, Is Nostalgia a Past or Future-Oriented Experience?
Affective, Behavioral, Social Cognitive, and Neuroscientific Evidence, 11 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1133
(2020) (“when individuals engage in nostalgic reflection, they are not hiding in the past. They are
accessing meaningful memories from the past in order to help them approach the future with
purpose.”).
69. Nicole Johnson, The Surprising Way Nostalgia Can Help Us Cope with the
Pandemic, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 21, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/
2020/07/surprising-role-of-nostalgia-during-coronavirus-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/E3UDH9HW] (attributed to Swiss medical student Johannes Hofer in 1688).
70. If madeleines come to mind, you are not alone. MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF
THINGS PAST (1913).
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out and extend to a wider sphere of the people we interact with. It’s a
social connectedness phenomenon and nostalgia is in that sense a very
healthy pro-social emotion. 71

Nostalgia is one likely reason for the unusually bi-partisan ambience
in the U.S. Congressional hearings on the Music Modernization Act. All
participants easily agreed with each other that something needed to be
done to protect individual musicians—specifically song-writers and
recording artists, as well as music publishers—from being shut out of the
profits made by internet streaming services (most of which had been going
to the record labels). 72 In our collective cultural imagination, the figure of
the musician, whether in the guise of the composer, the song-writer, the
instrumentalist, or the singer, is one that has the potential to transcend our
hyper-polarized political environment.73 Musicians can channel collective
nostalgia for past musical works, as well as trigger other positive
emotions, such as gratitude, generosity, elevation, and awe—and we can
share these feelings with people who have very different political views
from our own.
The hearings demonstrate the positive role that nostalgia can play
with regard to artistic and expressive works, which often trigger emotional
responses. Nostalgia provided a pro-social emotional platform for
members of Congress to reach across the aisle in an increasingly brutal
and frightening political world. Whether one is from a red or a blue state,
we can all share a national nostalgia about certain musical works, which
can then turn into pride over the creative boundlessness represented in our
shared cultural history.
Yet there are costs to this particular emotional response. Nostalgia
can minimize past harms and even glorify past injustices.74 According to
a recent summary of nostalgia research:

71. Speaking of Psychology, supra note 68.
72. 164 CONG. REC. S6259–61 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2018).
73. Recently, I have viewed several documentary films about musicians that formed the
soundtrack to my high school and college years, such as Jakob Dylan’s Echo in the Canyon and the
documentary about Linda Ronstadt, The Sound of My Voice. ECHO IN THE CANYON (Greenwich
Entertainment 2019); LINDA RONSTADT: THE SOUND OF MY VOICE (Greenwich Entertainment 2019).
74. As Krystine Batcho, a leading researcher in the field of nostalgia, recently writes,
“Historical nostalgia is often concurrent with a deep dissatisfaction with the present and a preference
for the way things were long ago. Unlike personal nostalgia, someone who experiences historical
nostalgia might have a more cynical perspective of the world, one colored by pain, trauma, regret or
adverse childhood experiences.” Krystine Batcho, The Psychological Benefits—and Trappings—of
Nostalgia, CONVERSATION (June 5, 2017, 8:11 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-psychologicalbenefits-and-trappings-of-nostalgia-77766 [https://perma.cc/57K2-2V9H].
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[N]ostalgia is not just a wistful glow associated with pleasurable events
and experiences. It is an innate response to pain or distress, and, in some
sense, a coming home. What’s more, cognitive scientists say, a defining
trait of nostalgia is its capacity to distort the past. 75

In addition, “it’s frequently triggered by low moods, loneliness, and
even a sense of meaninglessness. These triggers suggest[] that nostalgia
might be a kind of defense mechanism, a way to maintain resiliency
during periods of anxiety, despair, and existential distress.” 76 As leading
nostalgia researcher Krystine Batcho states, “[i]f people are unhappy for
any reason with how things are today, they’re more likely then to
experience this sense that things must have been better in the past. How
far they have to go in terms of their longing can depend upon how much
they know about history.” 77
In the context of musical copyright, nostalgia may flatten and
essentialize the experiences of many musicians who do not have the place
in history they deserve. Some musicians in the past were deemed to carry
threatening messages, such as Link Wray, an American Indian affiliated
with the Shawnee tribe, whose revolutionary guitar sound in his 1958 song
Rumble, was banned by US radio stations because the music (not words)
apparently challenged the status quo. 78 This sensitivity to subversion of a
particular national identity includes well-known musicians such as Igor
Stravinsky. Invited to Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1944 to deliver the
Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard, he prepared a controversial
arrangement of the Star Spangled Banner that provoked a police warning,
based on a law that is apparently still on the books. 79

75. Mike Mariani, How Nostalgia Made America Great Again, NAUTILUS (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/how-nostalgia-made-america-great-again
[https://perma.cc/4865-Q9YW].
76. Id.
77. Speaking of Psychology, supra note 68.
78. Madman Films, Rumble: The Indians Who Rocked the World—Official Trailer, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8E1VVadxjRw [https://perma.cc/4K72-FMEZ].
79. Stravinsky’s “Illegal” Arrangement of “The Star Spangled Banner” (1944), OPEN
CULTURE (July 4, 2015), http://www.openculture.com/2015/07/stravinskys-illegal-arrangement-ofthe-star-spangled-banner-1944.html [https://perma.cc/EX92-4UCH]. The statute states:
Whoever plays, sings or renders the “Star-Spangled Banner” in any public place, theater,
motion picture hall, restaurant or cafe, or at any public entertainment, other than as a whole
and separate composition or number, without embellishment or addition in the way of
national or other melodies, or whoever plays, sings or renders the “Star Spangled Banner”,
or any part thereof, as dance music, as an exit march or as a part of a melody of any kind,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264 § 9 (West 2020).
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Olufunmilayo Arewa, 80 K.J. Greene, 81 Robert Brauneis, 82 as well as
James Boyle and Jennifer Jenkins, 83 collaborating with the late Keith
Aoki, have written specifically about past unequal distribution of the
benefits of music copyright to black artists. We may not fully absorb these
and other cautionary tales from the past when over-relying on nostalgia.
Inequality within the music industry has present-day impacts, whether by
missed royalties or reputational benefits to past or current artists. As Mary
LaFrance concludes in her detailed analysis of the Music Modernization
Act:
[I]f the true purpose of the CLASSICS Act is “to enable older artists and
their families to benefit financially from their creativity,”the Act shows
a lack of imagination. By subjecting pre-1972 recordings to the same §
114 royalty scheme as copyrighted recordings, and by not giving the
recording artists any termination rights, the Act ensures that the lion’s
share of the financial rewards from the newly recognized right will go
to the record labels rather than the artists. 84

Nostalgia can strongly influence how we experience and respond to
challenging circumstances. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for
example, we might turn to the comforting and familiar cultural (and IPprotected!) products of the past. 85 Nostalgia’s immense power to comfort
and bring people together, as well as its potential to create a falsely
positive picture of the past, is increasingly understood.

80. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006).
81. K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the
Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 365 (2008); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural
Production, and the Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1179 (2008).
82. Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and Race: The Case of Mirror Cover Recordings (Geo.
Wash. U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-56, Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Public Law Research
Paper No. 2020-56, May 2, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3591113 [https://perma.cc/H5VSRAMH].
83. JAMES BOYLE, JENNIFER JENKINS & KEITH AOKI, THEFT! A HISTORY OF MUSIC (2017).
84. Mary LaFrance, Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of Streaming, 2 BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 310, 338 (2018) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 115651, at 15 (2018)).
85. Speaking of Psychology, supra note 68. Batcho mentions:
TV shows that are being rebooted or were popular in the ‘90s bands from long ago have
reunited and are going out on tour. There’s places like Buzzfeed often feature, top 20 lists
like top 20 toys from the 1980s that sort of thing. People really flock to that and want to
share their memories of certain toy.
Id.
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Hope

Another positive emotion associated with IP law and policy-making
is hope. Also viewed as a positive emotion, hope is often distinguished
from optimism in that hope is more likely to drive actions towards goals. 86
Australian legal scholar Peter Drahos wrote about the crucial role of
public hope on the part of developing countries in the context of
international IP treatymaking, and specifically the TRIPS negotiations.87
Drahos is the one of first IP scholars to address directly the role of emotion
in IP policymaking, without embedding it in a behavioral economics
framework.
Describing hope as “constituted of imagining and believing in the
possibility that some state of affairs in the future will come to pass,” 88
Drahos wrote:
The assumption of rationality has led to the dominance of calculative
approaches in international relations, with game theory providing the
dominant structure of calculation that is used to study decision making.
Yet the assumption that [nation-]states in certain circumstances are
emotional actors is no less plausible than the rationality assumption. In
fact, it may be more plausible. 89

The subject of Shepard Fairey’s “Hope” poster, former President Obama,
famously invoked many emotional tropes in his 2011 State of the Union
address:
We measure progress by the success of our people, by the jobs they can
find, and the quality of life those jobs offer, by the prospects of a small
business owner who dreams of turning a good idea into a thriving
enterprise, by the opportunities for a better life that we pass on to our
children.
That’s the project the American people want us to work on. Together.
....

86. Marcus Roth & Philipp Hammelstein, Hope as an Emotion of Expectancy: First
Assessment Results, GMS PSYCHO-SOC.-MED., Apr. 12, 2007; Kirsten Weir, Mission Impossible:
Being Hopeful is Good for You – and Psychologists’ Research is Pinpointing Ways to Foster the
Feeling, 44 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 42 (2013); Theories of Emotion, LUMEN: BOUNDLESS PSYCHOL.,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-psychology/chapter/theories-of-emotion/
[https://perma.cc/X6JK-V3E5].
87. Peter Drahos, Trading in Public Hope, 592 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 18
(2004).
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 23.
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. . . [But t]he rules have changed.
In a single generation, revolutions in technology have transformed the
way we live, work, and do business. . . .
....
The first step in winning the future is encouraging American innovation.
None of us can predict with certainty what the next big industry will be
or where the new jobs will come from. Thirty years ago, we couldn’t
know that something called the Internet would lead to an economic
revolution.
What we can do—what America does better than anyone else—is spark
the creativity and imagination of our people. 90

President Obama’s speech is a robust narrative of hope, invoking
innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity, all to indicate a future in
which every American can reap the benefits of technology to unify us as
diverse nation. And it resonates rhetorically, even as I personally have
some doubts substantively. 91 Along the same lines, the Trump
Administration quickly established an Office of American Innovation.
While it is not clear what the office accomplished beyond a few meetings,
its very name projects the same hopeful message that America is great (or
will be made great again) through American innovation. 92
Individual hope is certainly important in keeping one foot in front of
the other, in spite of the challenging circumstances that life can throw at
you. 93 On a personal level, my family of origin has always been and still
is intensely idealistic. I speculate that this focus on romanticizing life’s
realities must have been a partial response by my parents to traumatizing
first-hand experiences, such as forcible colonization of their country of
birth followed by a brutal civil war. However, the negative side of hope,
especially collective hope, 94 is disappointment, or worse, from unrealistic
90. 157 CONG. REC. 640 (2011).
91. As Anjali Vats points out, Obama’s invocation of the “American Dream was intertwined
with positive, yet intensely competitive and oppositional, public feelings that were also deeply
racialized.” VATS, supra note 32, at 115.
92. Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, Trump’s Office of American Innovation Must Be More
Transparent, Senators Say, FEDSCOOP (May 2, 2018), https://www.fedscoop.com/office-americaninnovation-white-house-trump-senators-letter/ [https://perma.cc/F764-875Q].
93. Elizabeth Bernstein, An Emotion We All Need More Of, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 21, 2016,
4:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-emotion-we-all-need-more-of-1458581680 [https://
perma.cc/FA3E-XWRN].
94. See Drahos, supra note 87, at 20. Defining the concept of “collective hope,” Drahos writes:
Daniel Bar-Tal (2001) identifies seven conditions of collective hope including the
necessity that the emotion be widely experienced in a society, that the beliefs that trigger
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expectations. Corporate marketing efforts and press releases often inflate
hope when discussing the fruits of technological progress. Consider
Google’s former slogan “Don’t be evil” 95 and its current admonition “Do
the right thing” 96—or Facebook’s now incredibly ironic “Be connected.
Be discovered. Be on Facebook.” 97
With regard to hope, Drahos asserts that:
It is this mental act of creating a sense of expectation or anticipation
about the future that seems to make hope an important psychological
resource for dealing with a future made uncertain by a threat of some
kind. . . . Individuals can possess and access the expectation, even if the
event to which the expectation relates is highly uncertain. This may in
fact be the only certainty in times when the threat is very great.” 98

IP scholars are not exempt from this tendency to have unrealistically
hopeful and perhaps even utopian expectations for the unpredictable
impacts of technological change. We might remember, for example, the
anticipation a quarter-century ago of the internet’s potential as a liberating
space for semiotic democracy. 99 Compare our enthusiasm then to the
reality we find ourselves in now: surrounded by disinformation and malice
fueled by social media. The early internet libertarian idea that information
wants to be free, 100 carried by the hope of ultimate unconstrained liberty,

Id.

the emotion be widely shared, that the cultural products of the society express the emotion
and the beliefs to which it is connected, and that the emotion and beliefs are part of
collective memory. Public hope is hope that is articulated or held by actors acting
politically in relation to societal goals.

95. Kate Conger, Google Removes “Don’t Be Evil” Clause from Its Code of Conduct, (May
18, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://gizmodo.com/google-removes-nearly-all-mentions-of-dont-be-evil-from1826153393 [https://perma.cc/5ZAA-Q9C9].
96. Id.
97. Double Talk at Facebook: Pandora’s Box in Mark’s Dorm, IRISH EXAMINER, (July 18,
2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/ourview/arid-30855912.html [https://
perma.cc/WG2Y-PNDW].
98. Id. at 21–22.
99. This term is attributed to John Fiske, a media studies scholar,
to describe a world where audiences freely and widely engage in the use of cultural
symbols in response to the forces of media. A semiotic democracy enables the audience,
to a varying degree, to ‘resist,’ ‘subvert,’ and ‘recode’ certain cultural symbols to express
meanings that are different from the ones intended by their creators, thereby empowering
consumers, rather than producers.
Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006).
100. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in
the Digital Age. (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is Wrong.), WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994,
12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ [https://perma.cc/T98N-V4PL]
(famously stating that “Information [w]ants to [b]e [f]ree” and that memes “self-reproduce, they
interact with their surroundings and adapt to them, they mutate, they persist. They evolve to fill the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2

550

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:529

is dangerously daft in light of the events culminating in the attack on our
nation’s capital on January 6, 2021.
Thus, ideas of authorship, creativity, inventorship, progress, and so
on both produce and are reproduced by strong emotions such nostalgia
and hope. These emotions tend to influence law in directions that would
be different if wholly rational legal actors were responsive only to
evidence-based information. Positive emotions along with their
associated framing of information keep us optimistic about our future as
a powerful yet fallible, and even vulnerable, species. And they give us
psychological incentives to propel ourselves towards a distant goal, vague
in its exact details, but perhaps not wholly unattainable.
To be sure, if these policy choices do not align completely with
realities on the ground, that may not be a cause for concern. But when the
emotional valences of IP are deployed for policy ends that are wildly
incongruent with either creative realities or social welfare outcomes, we
should be concerned. Collective hope in particular, is important—possibly
crucial—in motivating legal actors, as well as others, to work for positive
social change. Yet hope can be, and is, misused and manipulatively
marketed by what Drahos called the merchants of hope—whether by
political or corporate campaigns. Emotions also can mask legitimate
concerns that should be included within a rational analysis of science and
knowledge—and the legal institutions tasked with regulating them. IP
legal actors tend to grasp tightly to the hopeful narratives that our
innovation systems will inevitably bring the fruits of technological
progress to Americans. But they rarely ask the homeless persons in
California how well Silicon Valley is working for them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Law and emotions scholars claim that a greater consideration of
emotions “can inform both the more modest end of improving legal
doctrine, and the more ambitious aspiration of using law to produce
desirable emotional effects.” 101 As Bandes and Blumenthal, put it,
“Institutions are, inevitably, constructed in light of assumptions about
emotional dynamics, and these assumptions should be illuminated and
evaluated. Knowledge of emotional dynamics can be utilized to

empty niches of their local environments, which are, in this case the surrounding belief systems and
cultures of their hosts, namely, us.”).
101. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2033.
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restructure incentive systems and construct more effective legal
institutions.” 102
Abrams and Keren have trifurcated their efforts into illumination
(where a consideration of emotions can show where our existing accounts
of law may be incomplete), investigation, and integration. 103 This article
dwells upon the first two prongs, illumination and investigation, claiming
merely that important IP questions are on the table. Any answers require
careful analysis, including of emotions, regarding the underlying purposes
and benefits of IP.
If this article does not purport to offer any specific suggestions for
legal change at this juncture, where does this leave us? IP legal actors
probably can agree on the need for on-going and effective law reform, if
for no other reason than because technological change is accelerating, and
IP is the field of law most closely aligned to “technology,” whatever that
“weasel word,” as Judge Michel recently put it,104 means. Furthermore,
philosophers of science point out that scientific objectivity is almost never
value-neutral, and that we all should carry around with us a huge backpack
of humility regarding the limits of what we know. 105 They point out that
much of what people accept as knowledge, science, and truth is affected
by cultural and social contexts, constraints, and opportunities. The making
of knowledge, like any other social endeavor, is . . . well, social. 106 And
that social construction of knowledge includes our individual and
collective emotional responses. The emotional energy represented by IP
can be harnessed quite easily into directions that do not serve IP’s ultimate
102. Bandes & Blumenthal, supra note 30, at 173.
103. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2033. They elaborate:
The first dimension, “Illumination,” stands for the task of highlighting the often
unacknowledged way that emotions are implicated in a particular legal setting. The
second, “Investigation” reflects the interdisciplinary effort to better understand the nature
and characteristics of the specific emotions at issue. The third, “Integration,” represents
the challenge of incorporating the new affective insights gleaned through this effort into
normative suggestions for legal change. Not every example of law and emotions
scholarship encompasses each of these dimensions.
Id. at 2033–34.
104. Steve Brachmann & Eileen McDermott, First Senate Hearing on 101 Underscores That
WATCHDOG
(June
4,
2019),
“There’s
More
Work
to
Be
Done,”
IP
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/04/first-senate-hearing-on-101-underscores-that-theresmore-work-to-be-done/ [https://perma.cc/CSU7-QQ5S] (quoting Former Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Paul Michel).
105. Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong” Objectivity?, 36
CENTENNIAL REV. 437 (1992).
106. Timothy M. Lenton & Bruno Latour, Gaia 2.0: Could Humans Add Some Level of SelfAwareness to Earth’s Self-Regulation?, 361 SCIENCE 1066, 1067 (Sept. 14, 2018) (describing
networks and politics in climate change decision-making).
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goals, including dividing people of otherwise shared commitments toward
enhancing the power of creativity and innovation for social good. 107
One of the most challenging of our current technology-related issues
is how the benefits of social media seem to be hijacked by negative
emotions and their consequences. In addition, any regulatory approaches
must contend with the emotional impetus for, and consequences of, our
communicative activities, including but not limited to the neurologically
addictive impacts on the pleasure centers of the brain. By necessity, the
law and emotions field is cross-disciplinary, drawing simultaneously from
neuroscience and the humanities. 108 IP has much to contribute to and
benefit from this conversation, as well as to the larger goal of promoting
social welfare.
The two cultures problem 109 of the post-war military industrial era is
completely dwarfed today by what some have described as post-industrial
IP. 110 This includes the move from IP-protected goods to IP-protected
services 111 as one of one of many strategies to address post-scarcity.
Rampant concentration of informational power is occurring within what I
have termed cognitive capitalist business models.112 Attention,
undergirded by emotion, is the key transactional vector in our postscarcity and information-saturated digital economy. For example, as
consumers of IP-protected content, we are all increasingly exposed only
to the side of the story that we already want to see or hear.113 This is a
feature, not a bug, of our network-based media business models.
Characterized by passionately partisan politics, our current historical
107. Ouellette, supra note 10.
108. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1.
109. C.P. Snow, supra note 29, at 3 (“the intellectual life of the whole of western society
increasingly being split into two polar groups”).
110. Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
111. Sean M. O’Connor, The Multiple Levels of “Property” in IP and Why That Matters for the
Natural Versus Regulatory IP Debates, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. (Forthcoming 2018),
https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3252253 [https://perma.cc/W2AQ-4K45].
112. Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value Networks, 47 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 935 (2014); Margaret Chon, Tracermarks: A Proposed Information Intervention, 53 HOUS.
L. REV. 421 (2015); Margaret Chon, Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations
in Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 277 (2017).
113. These emotional responses seem to be exacerbated by what I once termed the “reversion
effect,” that is, the tendency to revert to familiar cultural scripts through new technological means
such as digital networked technologies. See Margaret Chon, Erasing Race? A Critical Race Feminist
View of Internet Identity Shifting, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 439, 441 (2000). This phenomenon,
which I described in the context of racial identity, is now more generally referred to by terms such as
“echo chambers,” “bubbles” or the “Daily Me”—that is, the proclivity to engage with social media
content that only confirms our pre-existing cognitive biases and beliefs, because they make us feel
better about ourselves. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (coining the “Daily Me”).
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moment is evidence enough that any comprehensive understanding of law
and policymaking should include a serious consideration of the roles of
emotions. Emotional responses might explain much of the post-fact
society that we seem to find ourselves in right now. Information may have
wanted to be free at one point in internet time, but we now know all too
well that it always comes with a cost.114
Today in IP, legal scholars can be skeptical about the basic
parameters of IP systems and are willing to stand down from the siren
calls of innovation and progress if these calls are leading us in the wrong
direction. Some of us are even willing to state that IP in certain
manifestations could be counter-productive to social welfare. By contrast,
many IP makers, including lawmakers and policy-makers, are typically
responding to short-term incentives—whether of the business or election
cycle. Thus the IP knowledge network, to use Latourian terminology, 115
is fraught with misaligned incentives that point in different policy
directions. Emotions provide some explanation for this disconnect.
Regardless, in our current dialogues about IP, we typically do not
acknowledge the individual and social contingencies in constructing our
knowledge—the science, if you will—of IP law, including its emotional
content. And this collective body of knowledge should include or even
begin with acknowledging ourselves as emotional beings, in additional to
rational actors. Put negatively, if we continue to ignore or minimize
emotions in IP, we also will continue to risk an incomplete conceptual
configuration of IP, at the cost of thwarting the primary policy goals of
this increasingly crucial area of law.

114. Guy Pessach, Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post IP Era,
54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 225 (2016).
115. Lenton & Latour, supra note 106.
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